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Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
ABSTRACT
Most empirical models of investment rely on the assumption that firms
are able to respond to prices set in centralized securities markets
(through the "cost of capital" or "q"). An alternative approach
emphasizes the importance of cash flow as a determinant of investment
spending, because of a "financing hierarchy," in which internal finance
has important cost advantages over external finance. We build on recent
research concerning imperfections in markets for equity and debt. This
work suggests that some firms do not have sufficient access to external
capital markets to enable them to respond to changes in the cost of
capital, asset prices, or tax—based investment incentives. To the
extent that firms are constrained in their ability to raise funds
externally, investment spending may be sensitive to the availability of
internal finance. That is, investment may display "excess sensitivity"
to movements in cash flow.
En this paper, we work within the q theory of investment, and examine
the importance of a financing hierarchy created by capital—market
imperfections. Using panel data on individual manufacturing firms,we
comparethe investment behavior of rapidly growing firms that exhaust
all of their internal finance with that of mature firms paying
dividends. We find that q values remain very high for significant
periods of time for firms paying no dividends, relative to those for
mature firms. We also find that investment is more sensitive to cash
flow for the group of firms that our model implies is most likely to
face external finance constraints. These results are consistent with
the augmented model we propose, which takes into account different
financing regimes for different groups of firms. Some extensions and
implications for public policy are discussed at the end.
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Studies of business investment and the impact of public policy on
investment have figured prominently in economic research since the
Keynesian revolution.1 Empirical models of investment generally rely on
the assumption that all firms respond similarly to prices set in
centralized securities markets (through the cost of capital or q).
Another line of inquiry, however, emphasizes the importance of cash flow
as a determinant of investment spending,2 because of a "financing
hierarchy" in which internal finance has cost advantages over external
finance.3 Recent research on imperfections in markets for equity and
debt emphasizes that all firms do not have the same access to external
capital markets. Thus, firms will not respond to changes in the cost of
capital, asset prices, or tax—based investment incentives in the same
way. For firms that face constraints in their ability to raise funds
externally, movements in cash flow maybeimportant determinants of
capital spending.
In this paper, we work within the q theory of investment, which has
been used extensively in empirical studies and for tax policy
evaluation. Empirical implementation of the model relies on the cost—
of—adjustment approach;4 previous results have not been uniformly
convincing.5 Recently, Abel and Blanchard (1986) find important roles
for profits and output in aggregate investment equations relying on q,
suggesting problems of aggregation or that firms do not face perfect
capital markets. We address both of these points. Our emphasis is on
the importance of using micro data to consider issues of firm
heterogeneity in capital markets; the model developed here shows that2
capital—market imperfections can, ljmit the availabilityof external
finance to particular types of firms.
To test the effects of financing constraints on q and investment,
careful attention must be paid to sectoral detail and firm heterogeneity
(see, for example, Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock, 1986). Thus, we use
data on manufacturing firms from the Value Line data base. Our strategy
is to identify differences in q, financing behavior, and investment
across firms classified by their retention behavior.We are
particularly interested in rapidly growing firms with currentinvestment
demands that exceed their current cash flow. If the cost disadvantage
of external finance is slight, then retention behavior should contain
little or no information about q or investment——firms will simply use
external finance to smooth investment when internal finance
fluctuates. On the other hand, if there is a pronounced financing
hierarchy, then firms retaining all of their income may effectivelybe
at a corner solution, where investment is limited by availableinternal
cash flow. In this case, there are two predictions of our theoretical
model that are the focus of our empirical work. Pirst, firms with high
retention ratios may have no low—cost marginal source of finance for
investment to drive q down to its conventional equilibrium level.
Second, the investment behavior of firms paying no dividendsshould be
driven by fluctuations in cash flow; in the limit, contractions incash
flow will reduce their investment dollar fordollar.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews models based
on imperfect information that explain why some firmsface restrictions
on issuing new shares or borrowing. In section III, we develop amodel3
of investment and financial decisions f or firms in different financing
regimes. Theoretical equilibrium values of marginal q can differ
markedly between firms exhausting all internal finance and mature firms
with high payout rates. En section IV, we present evidence on the
differences in Tobin's q for dividend—paying and non—dividend—paying
firms. We also estimate an augmented q investment equation that
incorporates the effect of cash flow. As our model predicts, the
investment of constrained firms is more sensitive to fluctuations in
cash flow than that of mature firms, and fluctuations in cash flow
account for economically important movements in investment for
constrained firms. The last section of the paper considers some of the
cyclical and policy implications of our findings.
II. CAP ITAL—KARIET IMPERFECTIONS, FINANCIAL (X)NSTRAINTS,
AND fli VESTMENT
Asyintric Inforaation and External Finance
Underperfect capital markets and no taxes, there is no cost
differential between internal and external finance. The existence of
transaction costs gives some advantage to internal finance, but these
costs appear to be small. When firms and potential investors have
asymmetric information about firms' prospects, however, it is possible
that some sources of external finance may have higher costs or even be
completely unavailable to certain categories of firms.
We consider first the case of tradeoffs between internal and
external equity finance. Important recent papers by Myers and Majluf
(1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984) explain why asymmetric4
information either eliminates any reliance on external equity finance in
the market or causes suppliers of new equity to demand a large
premium.7 These results are referred to as either "pecking order"
theories of finance (Myers, 1984) or as "financing hierarchy" theories.
Myers and Majluf consider a situation in which managers (or current
owners) are better informed than potential shareholders about the true
value of both the firmts investment opportunities and the existing
assets in place. The true value of the firm will eventually be
revealed, but new shares must be issued before this date, or the
investment opportunity is lost——a realistic assumption for new firing in
industries experiencing rapid technological advancement.En addition,
managers are assumed to act in the interest of existing shareholders,
and potential new investors are aware of this.
Myers and Majluf show that firms will turn down some investment
projects with positive net present values rather than issue new shares
under the circumstances. The basic argument applies Akerlof's (1970)
market for "lemons" model, but with a more complicated structure.
Appendix A illustrates the lemons discount demanded by potential new
shareholders (see also Petersen, 1987); we summarize the argument below.
Suppose there are two types of firms in a new industry, "good"
firms and "lemons." The value of assets in place is higher for good
firms, and only good firms have positive net—present—value investment
opportunities. Under these conditions, "lemons" are overvalued, and
they will always try to issue new shares——they can always invest the
funds in a zero net—present—value investment such as treasury bills. As
a result, new shareholders will demand a higher return from good firms5
to cover the losses incurred from inadvertently funding lemons (we work
this out in Appendix A). If this premium exceeds the share of the value
of a new project going to existing shareholders, new shares will not be
issued. For young firms with short track records, the probability of
purchasing shares of a lemon is undoubtedly high. As firms mature,
information asymmetries diminish and the lemons discount falls.
Debt considerations can be easily incorporated. In general, the
cost of debt will increase with the extent of borrowing.8 The precise
relationship between the quantity and shadow price of credit is likely
to vary across firms according to information imperfections. For
example, asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders can lead
to "credit rationing" to some categories of borrowers. In the model of
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), borrowers have private information about the
riskiness of their project returns, and lenders cannot necessarily
distinguish "good borrowers" from "bad borrowers." Under these
circumstances, higher loan interest rates lead to adverse selection of
borrowers with a high probability of default. Lenders may maximize
their profits by quantity rationing in competitive equilibrium.
Calomiris and Hubbard (1986) also show that when multiple credit markets
exist side by side——with some borrowers able to obtain funds in bond and
commercial paper markets and others restricted to bank markets—
aggregate shocks to collateral value or cash flow (e.g,, because of
business cycle downturns) make credit restrictions more likely to
borrowers that rely only on bank markets. In addition, the importance
of borrower net worth for obtaining external finance is stressed in
Leland and Pyle (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Calomiris and Hubbard
(1986), and Bernanke and Gertler (1987).6
These results imply that firms constrained by asymmetric
information in equity markets cannot easily substitute debt for new
share issues, absent substantial available internal finance and current
assets. The more severe the information asymmetry, the more likely that
external finance will be either very costly orunavailable.9
Information asymmetries are more pronounced for new firms and for small
firms whose stock is traded (if it is traded at all) in markets far less
organized than, say, the New York Stock Exchange. For mature
corporations, analysts specialize in gathering information for potential
investors about their prospects. Such information is expensive and is
provided only for firms with a large clientele of investors.
EmpiricalEvidence on CostDifferentials Between Internal
andExternal Finance
Many case studies have suggested that small firms have more limited
accessto external finance than large firms (see for example the
literature beginning with Butters and Lintner, 1945).10 Using data from
a variety of sources, Srini Vasan (1986, Chapter 3) has examined
differences in corporate financing behavior across firms of various
sizes. He finds striking differences in the reliance on internal and
external finance across firms. Small and medium—sized manufacturing
corporations (those with assets less than $100 million) are very
dependent on internal finance; this source accounted for over 85
percent of their total finance over the period from 1960 to 1980. These
corporations raised only about 3 percent of their total finance from
bonds and 2 percent from new share issues, with the balance coming from
bank loans. While large firms account for 74 percent of total7
manufacturing assets over the period, they issue 99 percent of all new
shares and 92 percent of all new corporate bonds. In addition,
retention ratios are substantially higher in the small and medium—sized
categories; many firms pay no dividends at all for substantial periods
of time.
This evidence indicates that most large firms, when faced with a
reduction in current earnings, can substitute either external finance or
reduce dividends. For smaller firms, however, any contraction in
earnings reduces their total finance. Srini Vasan also finds that
internal finance exhibits greater volatility over the business cycle in
small and medium—sized corporations than in large corporations.
Moreover, during downturns, large firms have greater relative access to
short—ten and long—tern debt markets. Hence, business recessions and
changes in corporate tax policy that affect internal finance will likely
have a much greater effect on the growth rates and investment behavior
of small, immature enterprises.
Some recent studies have tested for implied cost differences
between internal and external equity finance. McDonald and Soderstrom
(1986) examined financing behavior in a panel of 423 corporations listed
in the Compustat Industrial data file. Their results support the
existence of a financing hierarchy——where new equity issues are
undertaken only as a last resort. They also find evidence that
dividends provide marginal finance for firms when cash flow is high
relative to investment, while equity issues serve as the marginal source
of finance for firms that retain all of their earnings. Related work by
Kalay and Shimrat (1985) finds that almost one—third •of unregulated8
firms issuing new shares were paying no dividends, while the remainder
had, on average, very low payout ratios. Finally, Kalay and Shimrat
(1986) study the movement of stock and bond prices following the
announcement of a new share issue. Their evidence of a significant drop
in both bond and stock prices supports the "market—for—lemons" argument.
LII.FINANCLAL CONSTRAINTS, FINANCING DECISIONS, AND INVESTMENT
InvestuEnt and Financing Decisions of the Firm
The central feature of our argument is that for firms facing
asymmetric information in capital markets, q can fluctuate over a
substantialrange in excess of unity with little or no response of
investment, while investment can be "excessively sensitive" to cash flow
fluctuations. We demonstrate this result by modifying a simple model of
firm financial and investment decisions developed in the public finance
literature (see for example, Auerbach, 1984; Poterba and Summers, 1983,
1985). In tax—based models, there are differences in the costs of
internal and external finance because of the differential taxation of
capital gains and dividends at the personal level.'2 We first consider
decisions about corporate finance and investment in "full—information"
firms, that do not face financing constraints due to asymmetric
information. We then model the financing and investment decisions of
constrained firms.
In any period t, an existing shareholder's after—tax return Rt
the sum of a dividend return (taxed at rate e) and a capital gain (taxed
at rate c). The capital gain tax rate is an accrual—equivalent
effective tax rate, as in King (1977). That is,9
(1) R —(1—e)D÷ (1_c)(V÷i— v)
t_ Vt
where Dt represents the dividend payment by the firm, Vt is the value of
the firm's equity, and is the value in period t+1 of shares
outstanding in period t, which we assume is known with certainty. In
period t+1, the total value of the firm is
(2) V1 = +
where V represents net new share issues.
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That is, the total value of the firm is the present value of the post—
tax dividend stream adjusted for the present value of new share issues
which would have to be bought by current equity holders to maintain
their proportional claim on the firm. The firm maximizes its market
value, subject to a set of constraints.
The capital accumulation constraint is
(7) Kt =(1ó)K +
whereKt is the capital stock at the beginning of period t,Irepresents
investment, and 6 represents a constant rate of depreciation. Sources
of funds for the firm include post—tax profits, (1—r)1r(K) where T
is the corporate income tax rate, new share issues (V), and net
borrowing. The firm issues one—period debt at the beginning of each
period, paying an interest rate of i at the end of the period, where
i =i(B/K), > O. Uses of funds include dividend payments, debt
service, and investment. In general, the effective price of investment
will depend on the value of investment tax credits and the current value
of depreciation tax deductions. We ignore these considerations for
the moment, though we incorporate them in our empirical work. Thus, the
constraint that sources equal uses of funds yields
(8) (1—r)n(K) + ÷B— B_1 (1—i) i1B1 +
Thereare also implicit constraints on dividend payments and new
share issues. First, dividends cannot be negative, so that11
(9) )0.
Second, new share issues are assumed to be bounded from below by some
minimal (negative) level, 14
(10)
In summary, the firm chooses I, K, V, and to maximize Vt
subject to the constraints described above. That is, the firm acts to
(11) max (i +q__)—t{{(4i_)D_ V'] —AtfK—(1—d)K1_ I}l
—
at[(1-.r
)ir (K )++ Bt—Bi—D —1—(1_r )ijB 1
—8(V — VN)—
whereAt ' and are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the constraints.
The solution to this full—information problem is familiar (see
Auerbach, 1979, for example), and we do not repeat it here. We first
consider the case analyzed by Auerbach, in which firms are mature——cash
flow exceeds investment—and they pay dividends. Two basic results
emerge. First, if the dividend tax rate exceeds the capital gains tax
rate (0 > c), it is never optimal to issue new shares and pay dividends
at the same time: Vt can be increased by an equal decrease in
and V. Second, abstracting for the moment from corporate tax and12
debt considerations, for firms paying dividends, the equilibriumshadow
value of an additional unit of capital——marginal q——is equal
to (1—0)1(1—c). This is the q value at which shareholders are
indifferent between a dollar of retentions reinvested in thefirm and
taxed at rate c, and a dollar of dividends taxed at rate 0. Thus,
firms neither pay dividends nor issue new shares over a range——
< q < 1.If marginal q is below one it is not optimal to issue new
shares, but firms will reinvest earnings rather than paydividends as
long as q > (1—0)1(1—c), because of favorable capital gainstaxation.
Thus, taxation alone leads to a financing hierarchy with a
discontinuity between the effective costs of internal and external
finance. Such a hierarchy is shown in Figure 1 (see also Aaerbach,
1983b, 1984). When investment demand is low(asin the D schedule in
the figure), capital spending can be financed from internally generated
funds, at the expense of extra dividends, and marginal q isstill equal
to (1—0)/Cl—c) in equilibrium. When marginal q exceeds unityand the
demand for investment is very high (as in the D3 schedule), firmswill
issue new shares to restore marginal q to its equilibrium value of
unity. For intermediate levels of investment demand (asin the
schedule), debt finance will be used to bridge the gap between internal
and external equity finance. If 0 =0.30and c =0.05,these bounds
would be 0.74 and 1; the tax—induced range of q values overwhich firms
pay no dividends and issue no shares is, thus,probably small.
Capital—MarketImperfections, Corporate Finance, and Investment
Wenow considerrapidly growing firmsthat have investment demand









ability to raise funds externally.15 Two features of financing
constraints are incorporated in a simple modification of the model.
First, we assume that firms face a maximum debt to capital ratio of b
dictated by lenders, as in the models discussed in section II; that is,
increases in debt can be obtained only with an increase in internal
equity.'6 Second, to take into account the "lemons premium" (see
Appendix A), we reduce in equation (6) by an amount per dollar of
new equity issued.
The discount 1 represents the additional value that new investors
demand from "good" firms to compensate them for losses they incur from
inadvertently funding lemons.'7 The discount S can be readily connected
to the previous literature on new share issues and the "lemons
premium." Let the q value of good firms and lemons be denoted by qG and
qL, respectively, and the percentage of good firms be p. Because of
asymmetric information, all firms are initially valued at a weighted—
average value,=pqG+ (1p)qL. It is shown in Appendix A that the
breakeven q value of a dollar of new investment financed by share issues
is given by qq0/1 +&.
Underperfect information, good firms are valued at q0, and the
threshold q value for new share issues is unity. When good firms cannot
initially be distinguished from lemons, marginal q will exceed unity by
an amount that depends on the percentage of lemons and the difference
between the value of good firms and lemons. The ratio qG/q indicates
how much dilution occurs when good firms issue new shares; the lemons
premium, c,isequal to (qG/) —1.For example, suppose qG =5 andq
2, then fl is 1,5, and a new project must have a q of at least 2.5 before
managers will seek external equity finance.14
Incorporating the lemons premium, equation (6) becomes:
(12) Vt ;L"P)i [(19)Dt÷i —(1t)
We can now express the value maximization problem in equation (11) as:
(13) max t0 (1+
P




The first—order necessary conditions for the optimal investment program
include:
(14a) I : At +a(l_b)
=0
(14b) K:_A+(1+ .E__)(1-.s) A1 —a(l—r)w'(K) + (1+12__Y'(1_r)i
b2 =0
(14c)VN: —1 — — —= 0.
(14d)D: 1—c +a—= 0.
The range of q values for which firms neither pay dividends nor issue
new shares can be derived as follows. When firms are not paying
dividends and internal finance is exhausted, we know that S =0and15
(15) =—1—
With the lemons discount present, constrained firms will choose to issue
shares only when
(16) > (1 +2)(l
—b)
so that the supply—of—funds schedule facing the firm has a discontinuity
at the point where retentions are exhausted, as depicted in Figure 2.
New shares are issued only when internal finance is exhausted and
the marginal q on additional projects exceeds 1 +2t(l
—
be),as
illustrated by the U3 demand schedule in the figure. (The last term
accounts for the fact that new equity capital can be leveraged.) The
higher the value of Q, the greater the likelihood that a firm's
investment will be constrained by internal finance, as illustrated by
the U2 demand schedule in Figure 2. Of course, S2 can vary both across
firms and over time for the same firm.[f information asymmetries
become less severe over time, the top horizontal schedule in Figure 2
will shift downward toward unity.
The model has several direct empirical implications. First,
observed q values will differ across firms with different information
characteristics. For firms facing asymmetric information, the observed
q value will be the weighted average q discussed above. This may be
well above one because these firms have no low—cost marginal source of
finance to undertake the investment necessary to push q to its full—













substantially higher to induce a new share issue for limited—information
firms, than for full—Information firms, but the true marginal q is
unobservable. We can, however, observe q and its relationship to new
share issues. For "good" full—information firms, qG and q are the same,
so we expect no systematic link between observable q values and new
share issues. On the other hand,can move independently from qG for
limited—information firms. For example, the market may reappraise the
underlying probability that a firm is a lemon. If the asymmetric
information problem is important empirically, observed q values should
rise prior to new share issues for limitedinforination firms.
Finally, internal finance constrains investment spending for firms
that do not pay dividends and face an investment demand schedule like
in Figure 2. When q is sufficiently high, new shares are issued, and
movements in q will lead to movements in investment. Otherwise,
movements in investment are limited by changes in internal finance
(supplemented by allowed leverage of collateral). That is, variations
in the length of the retention segment in Figure 2 should cause matching
variation in investment. More specifically, investment__I(A)—— would
be determined according to
(17) At max[(1-+t)(1_bt), -
where =')7r(K)(1+b) .Thatis, investment is sometimes
restricted by the availability of internal finance. We test these
implications in our empirical work.17
In this formulation, the required rate of return does not depend on
the payout ratio. The basic model is in the spirit of the "new view" of
dividends (see e.g. Axierbach, 1979; Bradford, 1981; and King, 1977).
Given our emphasis on a financing hierarchy generated primarily by
capital—market imperfections, we can be agnostic as to motivations for
paying dividends. Cash flow would be an even more important determinant
of investment than our theoretical results suggest if firms face
signalling consequences of cutting dividends (see, for example,
Bhattacharya, 1979).18
To make the derivations presented above operational, we work within
the q—theory approach to investment (see Brainard and Tobin, 1968;
Tobin, 1969; and the subsequent advances in Mussa, 1977; Abel, 1979;
Hayashi, 1982; and Abel and Blanchard, 1986). In the basic version of
the model, the ratio of investment to the capital stock is a function of
q. We follow Summers (1981) in specifying a cost of adjustment per unit
of investment, 0(1/K), where adjustment costs are assumed to be expensed
for tax purposes. We can then rewrite equation (14a) for a firm i in
period t(ignoringtime subscripts on the tax variables) as
(18) Ait +ai(l_b1 +0(1-i)+Ø'(1—r)it) 0
Kit
In the absence of the financing constraints addressed here, Hayashi
(1982) and Summers (1981) link the shadow price to the market value of
existing capital.19 In that approach, under quadratic adjustment costs
(assumed to be constant across firms),2° equation (18) can be written as18
(19)iit =p1+ + uit,
whereI represents investment during the period, K is the replacement
value of the capital stock at the beginning of the period, p is the
normal value of (I/K)1, and Uit is white noise. Q represents the value
of Tobin's q at the beginning of the period (defined as the sum of the
value of equity and debt less the value of inventories divided by the
replacement cost of the capital stock), adjusted for corporate and
personal tax considerations (see Appendix B).
An alternative model is required to describe the investment
behavior of constrained firms, who are unable to respond to variations
in Q. In the simplest alternative, investment is constrained by
available cash flow (CF) in firms that retain all earnings, but which
have little or no access to external finance (beyond that obtained by




In practice, in any group of firms across time, financing constraints
will be binding for some of the firms and not for others. We estimate a





+ 21 Kit +Kit—1 + it19
We expect, however, that the estimated coefficients on cash flow viii be
larger in classes of firms that are more likely to face financing
constraints, a priori. The inclusion of cash flow measures in
investment equations is not novel; we integrate them formally here.
• ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCZ (it FINANCIALCONSTRAINTS AND INVESTMENT
TheData
We use Value Line data to examine the importance of financing
constraints in explaining investment. The detailed definitions of our
empirical measures are discussed in Appendix B. The firms in this data
base are typically large, and their stock is publicly traded. Evidence
that some of these firms face financing constraints should indicate that
the phenomenon is widespread.
We limit our attention to firms within the manufacturing sector
(SIC codes between 2000 and 3999). The selection of the time period is
very important to our study. We need enough years to obtain adequate
time—series variation; however, we also need to identify a set of firms
that may face financing constraints. Too long a time period would
permit constrained firms to mature, reducing the importance of
information—related financing constraints. With the above
considerations in mind, and taking into account the data availability,
we selected the period from 1970 to 1984.21 We also analyze
subintervals within this period.
The sample of fins was obtained as follows. We deleted
observations from the sample that had missing or inconsistent data. We20
also deleted firms with major mergers because mergers could cause
inconsistencies when constructing lags. This paper studies financial
constraints resulting from asymmetric information in capital markets,
not financial distress due to poor market performance. Therefore, only
those firms that had positive sales growth from 1969 to 1984 were
included in the sample. These restrictions still left us with a
substantial sample of 421 manufacturing firms.
We use a single criterion to identify firms that may face financing
constraints—firms' retention behavior over the sample period.22 The
model in section III implies that if information problems in capital
markets lead to financing constraints, they should bind on firms that
retain most of their income. [f, on the other hand, the cost
disadvantage of external finance is slight (e.g., only issue costs),
then retention behavior should contain little or no information about
investment behavior of the firm or its q value. Firms would simply use
external finance to smooth investment when internal finance fluctuates.
The classification scheme divides firms into four groups as
follows:
Class 1: Dividends< 0.1 for at least 10 years;
Income
Class 2:Dividends< 0.2 for at least 10 years, but not in class 1;
Income
Class3: DividendsC 0.4 for at least 10 years, but not in class 1 or 2;
Income
Class 4:All others.21
This approach limits the sensitivity of the classification to outliers
of the dividend—income ratio. In a particular year, this ratio could be
very high due to abnormally low income, even though the firm generally
retains most of its earnings. Thus, our approach is more robust than
classifying firms according to their average retention ratio.
Several summary statistics for the firms in each class are
presented in Table 1. Our class 1 firms—those that we hypothesize will
generally face binding financial constraints—retained an average of 95
percent of their income, and paid a dividend on average in only 35
percent of the years. The typical class 1 firm paid no dividends for
the first seven to ten years and a small dividend in the remaining
years. In fact, 21 firms in class 1 never paid a dividend over the
entire time period, although these firms are profitable, as the average
rate of return figures indicate. Going across classes, there is a
pronounced increase in the percentage of time that a positive dividend
is paid and a corresponding decrease in the retention ratio.
The classes are effectively sorted by firm size as well, as the
capital stock figures show. Class 1 firms experienced much more rapid
growth in the fixed capital stock than the mature firms in class 4.
Mean values of the capital stock are, of course, influenced by extreme
values. The pattern across the four classes for the median values of
the capital stock is similarly striking. While class 1 firms are small
relative to firms in class 4, they are still large relative to U.S.
manufacturing corporations in general; 85 percent of manufacturing
corporations had smaller capital stocks in 1970 than the average class 1
firm——the beginning of our sample period (based on information providedTABLE 1
Suanary Statistics: Sample of Manufacturing Firms, 1969—1984
Categoryof Firm






















Average rate of return
on market value of
common stock
51 39 188 143
0.95 0.85 0.68 0.34
35% 83% 98% 99%
97.3 314.6 648.4 2094.4
27.1 54.2 148.1 655.1
347.4 577.3 934.3 2778.4




14.6% 16.3% 14.3% 11.8%
Source: Authors' calculations based on samples selected from the
Value Line database.22
by the Quarterly Financial Reports of the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
Though we deal with fairly large firms even in class 1, we note
that for the manufacturing sector as a whole, firms with assets of less
than $50 million in 1970 (or a little over $100 million in 1982 dollars)
accounted for almost 20 percent of the assets of manufacturing firms.
We show later that class 1 firms have both a higher itan rate of
investment and higher volatility of capital spending, so that potential
financial constraints on this kind of firm will be important for
aggregate manufacturing investment.
The data in Table 2 present information on new share issues, debt
finance, and Tobin's q for firms in the various classes.23 Ceteris
paribus, one would expect firms in class 1 to rely more heavily on new
share issues than firms in the remaining classes. The typical firm in
class 1 has an investment demand schedule like D2 or 03 in Figure 2.
The typical firm in classes 3 or 4 has a demand schedule like and
should not simultaneously pay dividends and issue new shares——given the
taxation of corporate income. As the model in section (II predicts,
firms in class 1 issue new shares more frequently—approximately one
year in every four——than do firms in the other three classes. Firms in
the first class also raise a greater proportion of total finance from
new shares. Even for class 1, however, the amount of finance raised
from new share issues is small compared to funds generated from internal
cash flows.
The last two lines of Table 2 provide information on debt
utilization. Although one would expect the mature firms in classes 3TABLE 2
NewShare Issues and Tobin's q in Manufacturing Fins




Average value of share
26% 19% 12% 8%
issue as a percentage
of cash flow
Averageq values
23% 9% 5% 4%
for all years 3.9 2.5 1.8 1.6
Median q values for
(0.4) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1)
all years
Average difference in
1.6 1.4 1.0 0.7
q values between
periods of new share 1.6 0.9 0.4 0.0
issues and periods of (0.8) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1)
no new share issues
Average ratio of debt
to capital stock 0.59 0.52 0.39 0.28
Average ratio of
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
interest payments
to (interest payments 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.15
plus cash flows) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Source: Authors' calculations based on samples selected from the
Value Line database. The standard error of the mean appears
in parentheses below the average q values.23
and 4 to have higher debt capacities, the debt—to—capital ratios are
much higher for classes 1 and 2. These results are consistent with the
existence of a financing hierarchy and support the assumption in our
model that constrained firms borrow up to their debt capacity.24 It is
also noteworthy that the correlation between net borrowing and cash flow
is positive and more than three times greater in class 1 than class 4,
suggesting that class 1 firms are unable to smooth fluctuations in
internal finance with debt.
Table 2 also reports conventional Tobin's q measures for all four
classes of firms.25 The averages for classes I and 2 are significantly
greater than the averages for classes 3 and 4. The asymptotic t
statistic for the null hypothesis that the class 1 mean equals the class
4 mean is 5.8.26 This result also holds for, every year in the sample
individually. Similar patterns hold for median q values.
One might interpret the high q values observed in class 1 as the
result of high expected growth rates for these rapidly expanding
firms. As Table 1 shows, the class 1 firms did indeed grow very quickly
over our sample period. Their high q values, however, beg the question
of why these firms did not invest even more. As an alternative to
financing constraints, high adjustment costs could slow convergence of q
to a full—information equilibrium. Then, one would expect no systematic
relation between q and new share issues. Firms would invest at an
optimal pace to push q uniformly toward equilibrium, and new shares
would be issued as necessary to finance capital spending.27
The statistics in Table 2, however, strongly contradict this
view. We calculate the differences in q values in years with and24
without new share issues on a firm by firm basis and then compute an
average of differences.28 As noted in the table, for classes 1 through
4, this procedure yields differences of, respectively, 1.6, 0.9, 0.4 and
0.0. These results are consistent with the existence of a financing
hierarchy arising because of a "lemons premium." As already noted (see
Appendix A), firms will issue only if marginal q >qG/q,where qc is the
true q value for good firms and q is the observable weighted—average
value of q for good firms and lemons. When asymmetric information
problems are severe and the percentage of lemons is large, however, the
ratio of qG to q can be very large; that is, good firms may be
considerably undervalued. Observed q can vary independently of the true
qG for good firms. As lemons are revealed,rises, and the lemons
premium falls. At some point, at sufficiently high stock prices, good
firms will issue new shares. Our sample, of course, consists of
companies that ex post are good firms.
FinancingConstraints,Cash Flow, and Investment
The evidence on financing patterns presented to this point is
consistent with the view that information asymmetries generate
significant financial constraints, One implication of the model in
section III is that firms facing these financial constraints will
exhaust their cash flow to finance desired capital spending. The
summary statistics presented in Table 3 confirm this prediction for the
firms in our sample. The cash—flow—to—capital and investment—to—capital
ratios are roughly equivalent in class 1. Firms in classes 3 and 4
spend a much lower proportion of their cash flow on investment. TheTABLE 3
Cash Flow and InvestmentinManufacturingFirms
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Source: Authors' calculations based on samples selected from the
Value Line database.25
last two rows of Table 3 demonstrate the pronounced differences in the
volatility of both cash flow and investment in class 1 firms relative to
mature, dividend—paying firms.
The correlation results in Table 3 are especially striking. Both
investment and cash flow have pronounced upward trends in all classes.
The theory predicts, however, that the deviations from trend for cash
flow should be more closely linked with deviations of investment from
trend in classes 1 and 2 than in classes 3 and 4. Table 3 presents the
correlations of deviations in cash flow and investment from exponential
trends estimated from aggregate time—series data for each class from
1970 to 1984. For classes 1 and 2, aggregate deviations from the
investment trend are highly correlated with aggregate deviations from
the cash flow trend. The correlation drops off substantially, however,
for classes 3 and 4. Again, these results are consistent with the view
that capital—market imperfections prevent some groups of firms from
smoothing fluctuations in internal finance with external funds.
Our strategy is to estimate the contribution of cash flow toward
explaining investment (over and above movements in tax—adjusted Q). In
Table 4, we begin by reporting coefficient estimates for the basic Q
model described in equation (19), and estimates for the cash flow model
from equation (20) with only current and lagged CF/K included as
explanatory variables. In both cases, fixed firm29 and year effects are
included, and the equations are estimated for each of the four
classes. We report results using tax—adjusted Q only; results using the
unadjusted measure are very similar.TABLE 4
Effects of QorCash Flow Individually on Investint
DependentVariable: (I/K)j


























2 0.180.38 0.180.29 0.130.22 0.110.23
Note: The models estimated include fixed firm and year effects (not
reported). Standard errors are in parentheses.26
Three findings in Table 4 are of interest. First, positive and
precisely estimated coefficients of tax—adjusted Q are obtained in all
classes. The cash flow model, however, explains more of the variation
in investment in all classes than does Q.In addition, the pattern of
coefficients on current cash flow suggests a much greater sensitivity of
investment to contemporaneous fluctuations in cash flow for firms in
class 1 than for firms in the other classes.
The most convincing results come from estimates of the model in
which both Q and cash flow variables are included. We report these
results in Table 5. The fifteen years covered by our sample may be too
long a period over which to classify fins; that is, some firms may have
"matured" over the period. To address this possibility, we report
estimates over two time periods——1970—1977 and the full sample, 1970—
1984.
The estimate of positive coefficients on the cash flow variables
(i.e., an apparent "excess sensitivity" of investment to cash flow) need
not imply that capital—market imperfections are important. Our data
measure average Q, and the theory pertains, of course, to marginal Q.
Cash flow could contain information about movements in marginal Q not
captured in average Q.30 Indeed, estimated coefficients on lagged cash
flow are positive, statistically significant, and of comparable
magnitude for all classes, suggesting that, for whatever reason, cash
flow contributes to explaining investment over and above Q.3' This is
not surprising, given the estimates for aggregate time—series in
manufacturing from Abel and Blanchard (1986).Dependent Variable: (I/K) it
TABLE 5




























Note: The models were estimated using fixed firm
Standard errors are in parentheses.
and yeareffects (not reported).






The theory presented here does suggest, however, that there should
be economically important differences in the effects of cash flow on
investment across our classes of firms. In this respect, we focus on
the coefficient on current cash flow. With quarterly data, lagged cash
flow would not be a bad proxy for a constrained firm's ability to
undertake investment, but a year is a substantial period of time.32 The
pattern of the coefficients on current cash flow across classes is quite
striking. For the early period, they range from about 0.54 in class 1
to 0.18 in class 4. Again, it is the differences in the magnitudes of
the estimated coefficients that we stress; that all of the coefficients
are different from zero is not surprising given the limitations of the Q
model. The fact that the addition of cash flow reduces the estimated
coefficient on Q to zero in class 4 suggests the collinearity of cash
flow and Q for those firms.
The economic importance of these results is reinforced by the
higher variability of cash flow in class 1. The results in Tables 3 and
5 imply that investment is roughly three times more sensitive to cash
flow variations in class 1 relative to classes 3 and 4, while the
underlying cash flow variations are about four times larger in class
As an example of the implications of these observations, consider
the predictions of the model for the investment expansion that occurred
between 1975 and 1979. The average cash flow to investment ratio for
class 4 rose by 0.005 over this period. The model estimated over the
full sample predicts that this would cause an increase of 0.001 in the
class 4 investment to capital ratio, a small change equal to only one
percent of the class 4 sample average. For class 1, however, the cash28
flow to capital ratio increasedby 0.082 over the same period. The
model implies that this wouldcause an increase in the investment to
capital ratio of 0.035. This is 35 timeslarger than the change
predicted for class 4; it is over 13 timeslarger as a percentage of the
sample average investment to capital ratio.Similar differences can be
obtained for other periods.34 Effectsof this size have clear economic
consequences for constrained firms. Moreover,even if constrained firms
donot undertake themajority of aggregate investment, their potential
investmentvariation isso large that itis likely significant for the
explanation of aggregate investmentcycles.
We also considered twoalternativemodels in which cash flow might
appearimportant for investment,even given the inclusion of the
beginning—of—periodQinthe model—(i) movements in cash flow reflect
news about market fundamentals not captured inthe beginning—of—period
Q;or (ii) cash flow and salesare highly correlated, and"accelerator"
mechanisms are responsible for the results.35
We pursued two testsof the first alternative. First,we estimated
the models reported in Table 5using only Qandcurrent cash flow and an
instrumental—variables procedure (with firmdummies,time dummies, and
lagged values of Q and CF/K as instrumentalvariables). Those results
are similarly striking; for the early subperiod, thecoefficient on CF/K
in class 1 is not significantly differentfrom unity, while the esti-
mated coefficient for class 4 isroughly the same as the sum of the
coefficients on current and lagged CF/K in theOLS regressions. Second,
adding Qdatedat the end of the current period, that includesall29
news arriving in the current period,produced no important differencein
the cash—flow coefficients.
With respect to the second alternative
explanation, we added
current and lagged gales (deflatedby K) to the investment equation.
Estimated coefficients on salesdiffered little across classes. The
coefficients on contemporaneous cash
flow across the four classes for
the full sample fell to 0.289, 0.091,—0.004, and 0.027, respectively.
Only the estimate for class1 is significantly different from zeroat
the five—percent level. Theseresults extend those presented inTable
5. That is, given potential problemswith the Q model, there may be
reasons for variables otherthan Q to influence investment. Important
effects of cash flow on investment appear,however, only in firms
ideatif led a priori as facing financingconstraints.
In summary, the results in Table5 suggest important impacts of
fluctuations in the availability ofinternal finance on investment.
These effects are magnified bythe fact that cash flow is highly var-
iable for the rapidly growing firms
in class 1, while mature firms in
class 4 experience very small variationin cash flow. Internal funds
contribute to explaining investment
in all classes—even for firms that
have much more cash flow thaninvestment—most likely indicating the
pitfalls in using average Qin empirical studies. For our purposes,
however, the fundamental resultis the substantial difference across
classes in the impact of cashflow on investment. These differencesare
consistent with the cost differentialbetween internal and external
equity finance predicted by ourmodel, and the differences in qvalues
across classes.30
Finally, it is important to stress that the firms we examine——even
the rapidly growing smaller firms in class 1——are manufacturing
corporations which are large by economy—wide standards. The
significance of capital—market imperfections in dictating the importance
of internal finance for capital spending is no doubt of stillgreater
concern for smaller companies, which have more difficult access (or no
access) to centralized securities markets.
V. CONCLUSIONSANDPOLICY IMPLICATIONS
Standardmodelsof business fixed investment—working either from
the price effects of changes in the cost of capital or induced effects
of changes in asset valuations——typically rely on perfect capital
markets. To the extent that firms do not face a cost of capital on the
margin set in centralized securities markets, or there are constraints
on firms' ability to participate in particular markets for external
finance, standard models may yield misleading predictions about the
impact of public policies on investment. In this paper, we work within
the framework of the q—theory of investment, and show that imperfect
information can create "financing hierarchies" over the use of internal
and external finance which accentuate hierarchies created solely from
tax considerations.36 The clear implication is that for many firms—
particularly developing firms in rapidly growing industries—there may
be a significant range of q values over which no dividends are paid and
external finance is very costly to obtain. Large variations inq may
have little effect on investment. Rather, investment is constrained by
current cash flow. Our empirical evidence for U.S. manufacturing firms
in the Value Line data base suggests that such patterns are important.31
These results suggest several areas for future research. First,
the presence of constrained firms complicates the analysis of the
effects of tax reform on investment. The most obvious example relates
to changes in the corporate profit tax rate. For example, Summers
(1981) concludes that the short—run impact on investment of an increase
in the corporate tax rate is ambiguous—because benefits from expensing
investment adjustment costs and the increased value of the tax deduction
fordepreciation may offset the effect of increased taxes in reducing
dividends. For firms that face financing constraints, increases in
corporatetaxes can crowd out investment significantly through the
additional channel of reduced internal cash flow (see also Greenwald and
Stiglitz, l987). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, for example, is widely
believed to have increased the marginal corporate cost of capital. On
the other hand, tax reform substantially reduced the tax rate on
marginal as well as inframarginal corporate profit. For financially
constrained firms, this latter effect may be much more important for
investment than the increased cost of capital. Because constrained
firms probably constitute the most dynamic, progressive sector of the
economy, the effect of public policy on their investmentand growth
deserves particular emphasis.38'39
The result that financial constraints are important even for
relatively large manufacturing firms also suggests some empirical
promise for recent information—based models of procyclical investment
(see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler, 1987; Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1986; and Calomiris and Hubbard, 1986). In these models, aggregate
shocks can have strong effects on the allocation of external finance for
investment across different categories of firms. Such models present a32
challenge to conventional analyses of the effects of fiscal and monetary
policies on investment that focus primarily on price effects through the
cost of capital.
Finally, the existence of financing constraints has many impli-
cations for research in industrial organization. Many mergers appear to
match corporations that face different costs of capital on the margin
because of different earnings and growth prospects. Such combinations
would permit reallocations of capital that bypass external capital
markets. Large differentials in the cost of internal and external
finance can also rationalize such strategies as predatory pricing and
limit pricing. For example, Judd and Petersen (1986) show that dynamic
limit pricing is a profit—maximizing strategy for a dominant firm facing
a financially constrained fringe, while Petersen (1987) argues that an
"absolute capital requirement" entry barrier is a logical outcome of a
financing hierarchy. The results presented in this paper provide
empirical support for the existence of imperfect capital markets and
financing constraints that underlie these theoretical results.33
NOTES
'Muchdebate has centered on the effects of taxpolicyon capital
spending in "flexible accelerator" models (e.g., Eisner, 1978),
"neoclassical" investment models (e.g., Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Eisner
and Nadiri, 1968; and Bischoff, 1971), and "q" models (e.g., Summers,
1981; Salinger and Summers, 1983). Also see the review in Clark (1979).
2Meyer and Kuh (1957, chapter 10) emphasized the importance of
internal liquidity for investment in general, and for small firms, in
particular. Another early statement of this view can be found in
Duesenberry (1958); it has been extended by Minsky (1975) and tested
empirically by Fazzari and Mott (1986). Kuh and Meyer (1963) examined
the influence of internal liquidity on investment, finding that the
timing of investment spending is linked closely to the availability of
funds over most of the business cycle. Similar results are obtained in
Coen (1971) using aggregate data. Eisner (1978) found that the timing
of investment in small firms is more responsive to profits than in large
firms for some specifications. Chirinko (1987) finds an important role
for liquidity in explaining investment in aggregate data, though the
effect is not robust to changes in estimation technique. Pazzari and
Athey (1987) present supporting evidence for the role of cash flow in
investment functions estimated from micro data.
In a careful study of Japanese firms, Hayashi and Inoue (1987) find
that profits enter importantly in a Q model of investment. They point
out, however, that when shocks to firm cash flow are correlated with
shocks to the adjustment cost function, a positive coefficient on cash
flow could just reflect a bias in the estimate of the Q coefficient.
3The notion of a hierarchy, in which internal funds are cheaper
than external funds, has been explained in the absence of financing
constraints in the public finance literature (e.g., Auerbach, 1979,
1984), because of the differential tax treatment of dividends and
capital gains. Earlier studies emphasized a hierarchy arising from
transactions costs; see for example Baumol, Heim, Malkiel, and Quandt
(1970).
4'rhe q theory linked to the cost—of—adjustment paradigm permits
segregation of expectation lags (captured in q) and delivery or
adjustment lags (captured in the adjustment cost function). See Eisner
and Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967a, 1967b), Gould (1968), and Treadway
(1969).
5Empirical investment studies relying on q have not always been
found a significant role for q. In addition, the unexplained movement
in investment displays serial correlation, which is inconsistent with
the theory. See for example von Furstenberg (1977), Clark (1979),
Blanchard and Wyplosz (1981), and Summers (1981).34
6Firuis have relied heavilyon internal finance for growth and
development in U.S. manufacturing since at least the end of the
nineteenth century (see the discussion in Hansen, 1941). It isquite
striking that the automobile industry——today a classic mature industry——
developed largely from retentions. Even by the 1920s, only three of the
eight major automobile manufacturers (General Motors, Packard, and
Studebaker) maintained any noticeable reliance on external equity
capital. By 1926, retained earings were more than fifty percent of net
worth even in these large companies (Seltzer, 1928).
7Other general discussions of thenegative effects of external
financing on the value of claims of existing shareholders can be found
in Huberman (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985).
8Several studies have found that thecapacity to use debt may be
limited, in the sense that the required rates of return on debt and
equity increase with leverage (see, for example, Baumol and Malkiel,
1967; Auerbach, 1979; and Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski, 1978;
Gordon, 1982). See also Kim (1978) and Hayashi (1985a) for a derivation
of the optimal debt—capital ratio in thepresence of bankruptcy costs.
9A natural question, ofcourse, is why financially constrained
firms are not acquired by mature, cash—rich firms. At least three
factors limit such a process: (i) managerial diseconomies in
conglomerates, (ii) asymmetric information—an acquiring firm finds
itself in a situation qualitatively similar to the providers of external
finance in the models discussed in the text, and (iii) somedegree of
individual specificity of project endowments.
10Butters and Lintner (1945) citenumerous studies reporting
constraints on external finance during the Depression for otherwise
profitable small, growing firms. Small firms actually increased their
average retention ratios during the early 1930s, while the largest firms
paid out more than their current earnings in some periods.
11Similar patterns were noted inearly studies for the 1930s; that
is,profitable small firms maintained consistently higher retention
ratios than did large corporations (seefor example Crum, 1939).
'2Poterba and Summers (1985) note that underthe "tax irrelevance"
view of dividend taxation advanced by Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982),
share prices are determined by investors for whom themarginal tax rates
on dividends and capital gains are equal, so that marginalq will be
unity in either case. The "new view" assumes that dividends are the
primary vehicle for transferring money out of the corporate sector. To
the extent that corporate takeovers or share repurchasesare important,
(see Shoven, 1987), the approach may have limitations forexplaining
financing behavior, even in mature firms.35
'3We have in mind full—information" firms here, so that i'> 0
reflects the market's assessment of marginal changes in the probability
of default.
14While share repurchases are not prohibited in the U.S., they may
be treated as dividends by the IRS. See the discussion in Auerbach
(1979).
15Hayashi (1985a) also develops a model within the q—theory
framework in which there are three financing regimes——internal finance,
debt finance, and external equity finance.
'6The debt capacity constraint is assumed to binding; a proportion
(1—b) of funds required for investment must be financed from cash flow
and new share issues. This approach follows Summers (1981).
'71t will certainly be the case that 2 will vary across firms; we
address this in our empirical work in section IV.
'8"Signalling" explanations of dividend payments fail to explain
why small developing firms (presumably facing substantially imperfect
markets for external finance) generally pay little or none of their
earnings in dividends, while mature companies have relatively high
payout ratios. The agency explanation suggested by Easterbrook(1984)
and Jensen (1986)—that shareholders prefer managers to face the
discipline of and monitoring provided by external capital markets for
debt and equity—is probably more promising for mature firms. Within
the framework suggested here, one can imagine that firms face a
tradeoff, as they develop, between the shadow value of the "agency
benefit" from paying a dividend of one dollar and shadow value of a
dollar's worth of investment. If the latter is very high for firms
facing severe external capital constraints, developing firms in rapidly
growing markets will pay no dividends initially. The "traditional"view
of dividends (see the discussion in Poterba and Summers, 1985) may well
be correct for large mature firms, but empirical work must be careful to
distinguish firms according to their financial hierarchies.
191t is important, of course, to specify conditions under which the
stock market provides a proxy for marginal q (see for example Hayashi,
1982). The following restrictive assumptions are required: Ci) capital
is homogeneous and malleable; and (ii) firms produce with constant
returns to scale (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981, and Salinger, 1984, derive
an expression for q in the presence of monopoly rents.). While these
assumptions may call into question the general applicability of the q
approach, they apply as well to most versions of the standard flexible
accelerator approach. Wildasin (1984) notes also that average q may be
a poor proxy when there are many types of capital goods. In any event,
our interest lies principally in comparing the performance of themodel
across various groups of firms.36
It is not obvious that distinctions between marginal and averageq
lie at the heart of empirical difficulties. Abel and Blanchard (1986)
estimate a series for marginal q for aggregate U.S. manufacturing. They
note (p. 250): "Since our findings are so similar to the results
obtained relating investment to average q, we find little support for
the view that the low explanatory power of average q is due to the fact
that average q is a poor proxy for the theoretically more appealing
marginal q•fl
20That is, we assume thatadjustment costs A follow
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21Manufacturing firms were included in the sample only ifthey had
data observations from 1969 to 1984. The 1969 data were used for
constructing lags. We choose 1969 as the starting point because the
number of firms and data items available on Value Line increased
substantially in 1969. The number of firms that had observations on the
necessary variables dropped significantly after 1984. We found 675
firms with some data from 1969 to 1984. The sample was reduced to 421
firms for reasons discussed in the text.
22Under perfect capital markets, ofcourse, dividend and investment
decisions are independent (the Modigliani—Miller theorem). Previous
studies have attempted to estimate dividend and investment functions
jointly (see, for example, Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967; and the criticism in
Fama, 1974), but none has tried to group firms so as to permit a test of
financing hierarchies applying to some firms and not others.
Our scheme for grouping firms according to differences in dividend
behavior is similar to tests for the presence of liquidity constraints
on consumption, in which households were grouped into "high—wealth" and
"low—wealth" categories (see for example klayashi, 1985b; and Zeldes,
1985).
23Some firms reported frequent, butvery small new share issues
that were probably associated with executive stock option plans. We
counted positive common finance as a substantive new share issue only if
the funds raised exceeded 10 percent of the firm's cash flow in thesame
year.37
24The pattern of debt leverage across classes also holds for debt—
equity ratios measured as the book value of debt divided by the book
value of common equity. The effect on investment of debt service
measures that emphasize interest expense relative to cash flow are
discussed by Minsky (1975), Eckstein and Sinai (1986), and Fazzari and
Athey (1987).
25We also performed a similar exercise for two measures of tax—
adjusted Q(seethe definition in Appendix B), and the patterns were
even more dramatic.
26The t test for equality of means is valid only asymptotically
because the variances of the q measures are clearly different across
classes -
27Analternative explanation of the high Tobin's q values in class
1 is the relative importance of "intangibles" for such firms. It is
difficult, however, to link that story to the large differences in q
values between periods in which new shares are issued and periods in
which no new shares are issued.
28The average difference reported in Table 2 is computed as
follows. We first compute the average difference on a firm—by—firm
basis for all firms that issued shares in at least one of our sample
years. These statistics are then averaged across firms in each class to
obtain the results in Table 2. Thus, differences in average q levels
between firms that issue shares and firms that do not issue would not
affect the reported statistics.
29problems of high values of average Q stemming from monopoly rents
not captured in our formulation (see the discussion in Lindenberg and
Ross, 1981, and Salinger, 1984) will be eliminated by using fixed—
effects methods as long as the markup of price over marginal cost is
constant over the period.
30Another explanation is that the stock market is excessively
volatile, so that information about fundamentals is better conveyed
through cash flow than q. To be consistent with the pattern of results
in Table 5, an "excess volatility" story would have to explain why q is
a poorer signal in growing firms paying out little or none of their
profits as dividends.
31Hayashi (1985a) notes that it is possible that an increase In
current cash flow (with no expected effect on future cash flows) could
increase current investment just by placing the firm in different
financing regimes.
32Abel and Blanchard (1986) consider three (quarterly) lags of
profits in a q model for investment using aggregate data for the manu-
facturing sector. This time period would fit within our contemporaneous
annual observation; Abel and Blanchard found only the coefficient on the
first lag of profits to be statistically different from zero.38
33For the period 1970—1984, the totalsum of squares for the four
classes are, respectively, 37.84, 5.80, 14.06 and 5.29, while the number
of observations are 725, 560, 2788, and 2140, respectively.
34mese differences would be even larger if the model estimates for
the first half of the sample were used (when the constraints on class 1
firms were likely the most severe. Larger quantitative effects could
also be obtained if the variation explained by cyclical effects captured
in the annual intercepts were included.
35Results are not reported here, butare available from the authors
upon request.
36lndeed, as a result of recent tax reform, the wedge between taxes
on dividends and capital gains that leads to a financing hierarchy has
been virtually eliminated.
37A related concern is that to the extent thatsmall, immature
firms are probably more likely to have negative earnings in a given
year, they are less likely to realize the benefits of the investment tax
credit. Our point is that, even with positive earnings, the tax rate
relevant for a firm constrained in both equity and debt markets is the
average tax rate.
38Analogously, Hubbard and Judd (1986, 1987) demonstrate the
importance of the distribution of tax changes for consumption in the
presence of borrowing restrictions ("Internal finance constraints").
39Calomiris and Hubbard (1986)suggest a role for differential
taxation of corporate income according to information imperfections
faced in credit markets. One possibility here Is a reduction in the
corporate tax financed by an increase in the dividend tax. If the
Auerbach (1979)—Bradford (1981)—King (1977) view of dividends (as a
residual) is correct, such a policy might well raise investment
substantially. Such a reform would be more costly if dividend payments
were important as a signal of the firm's health (as in Bhattacharya,
1979) or to restrict managerial discretion (as in Jensen and Heckling,
1976; or Jensen, 1986).39
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Asyinetric Information andtheDifferential Cost of
Internal andExternal EquityFinance
Tomotivate the lemons discount described in thetext, consider the
followingexample adapted from Myers and Majluf (1984). Suppose a new
industry has two types of firms, "good" firms (type C) and "lemons"
(type L). Let good firms account for a fraction p of the firms, with
the fraction i—p being lemons. Gross returns from assets in placeare
given by G and L' respectively, while gross returns from new
investment opportunities are given by Y andL'respectively.The net
return on new investment by lemons must clearly be bounded from below by
the risk—free return, because managers of lemons can always investnew
funds in riskiess assets.
Managers of lemons will always attempt to issue new shares.
Managers of good firms, however, will issue shares and undertake the new
investment project only under certain conditions. Provided that the
market for new share issues does not collapse completely because of the
lemons problem, the market value of either firm type wouldequal
='G
+ + +
Goodfirms are undervalued here, because V is less than +Y,their
ultimate value if they make the new investment. However,managers know
that Y will be lost unless new shares are issued.A2
Whenwillgood firms issue new shares? Thedivision of market
value between old (V0) and new(7N) shareholders can be expressed as
V0 =(v/(v+I)) ÷ Y), and
vN =(I/(V+I)) +
respectively,where I is the dollar value contributed by new equity
holders to finance the new project.
While undertaking the project raises the market valueof the fin
expost, the division of market valuewill be in the interest of
existing shareholders, only if
(Al) (V/(V+Ifl(YG + >, or(t/(v+I)) G C(V/(V+I))Y
That is, making the new investment is in the interestof existing
shareholders only if the share of existing assets going to new
shareholders is less than or equal to the share of thevalue of the new
investment going to existing shareholders.
Expression (Al) can be rewritten as the"breakeven" marginal q
value required by new projects. Algebraic manipulationof (Al) yields:
(A2) Y/I )YGIVA3
The left—hand side of (A2) is the fir&smarginal q on a new
investment. If I is small relative to V, theright—hand side of (A2) is
approximately:
YG/VqG/q
where qC is the true value of good firms andis the weighted average
value of good firms and lemons. The lemonspremium——cl——is equal to
(qG/ )— 1.
A simple example may help to clarify the issues.Suppose that p =
1/4,(1 —p)=3/4,Y =$500,h= $50and the replacement cost of the
capital stock equals $100. (This implies a Tobin'sq of 5 for good
firms and 1/2 for lemons.) In addition,suppose that a new investment
opportunity will yield $100 and =$50and that I = $50;that
is, for good firing, marginal q is 2.
If good firms undertake the new investmentopportunity, V will
increase from $500 to $600. However, this willnot be in the best
interest of existing shareholders, because V°$490 and =$110.
That is, new investors demand a lemonspremium of ($110—$50)/$50 =1.2
This is the value denoted by Q in the text. Theinvestment will not be
undertaken because its marginalq is less than 1412.APPENDIX B
VariablesUsedinEjipirical Work
We useannual data from Value Line sources covering the period from1969
to 1984.
Market Value of Equity (V). The value of common stock at the beginning
of the year is the average price over the last fiscal quarterof the
previous year times the number of shares outstandingat the end of the
previous fiscal year. For the preferred stock, we computethe market
value by dividing preferred dividends by the preferred stock yieldfrom
Standard and Poor's.
Market Value of Debt (B). We use the book value of debt. For
discussion of conversions of book value to market value, see Brainard,
Shoven, and Weiss (1980) and Salinger and Summers (1983).
Replacement Value of the Capital Stock (K). Kt representsthe capital
stock at the beginning of period t. The replacement value of property,
plant, and equipment is estimated from book values using amethod
similar to Salinger and Summers (1983). We set the initialvalue of K
to the book value of gross plant for the first yearthe firm appers on
the Value Line database. The capital stock is then defined iteratively
as
B1112
{I ÷ Kt_ij x (1—1/LIFE).
where P is the implicit price deflator for fixednon—residential
investment, 1 is the firm's capital spending, and LIFE is theaverage
service life implicit in the firm's book depreciationcosts (see
Salinger and Summers, 1983). The final term is based on theassumption
that economic depreciation is single—declining balance.Our results
were not changed substantially when we assumed double—declining balance
economic depreciation or when the initial value of Kwas set equal too
the firm's net plant. For mature firms, thestarting point for this
procedure generally stretched back to the late 1950g. Fornewer firms,
the initial book value of their capital stockprobably is a good
estimate of its replacement cost. Thus, the capital stockestimates
should exhibit little inflationary bias forour sample that begins in
1969.
Tax Parameters for Q. As in Salinger and Summers(1983), we estimate
values for X1 and z, assuming that Ci) taxpolicy parameters are assumed
to remain constant, and (ii) the sum of the requiredrates of return on





where 71representsinflation and Kt is the nominal replacement valueof
the capital stock, and
tz =r(
1—c
Tax depreciation is assumed to be double—decliningbalance at rate
6 =2/LIFE.The average effective tax rate on dividends (0) is taken
from Feldstein and Jun (1986). We assume that theeffective tax rate
applicable to non—dividend cash flows over the period was5 percent (see
Protopapadakis, 1983; and Shoven, 1986). The corporatetax rate Twas
set at the statutory maximum marginal rate.
Market value of inventories (N). Since inventories areincluded in the
market valuation of the firm, but not in the replacement costof the
fixed capital stock, we subtract N from the market value of thefirm.
There was no substantial difference in the results when N wasinstead
added to the replacement cost of the firm's capital stock.Inventories
for each firm are converted from book value to market value usingthe
procedure outlined in Salinger and Summers (1983)and Value Line data
concerning whether the firm uses LIFO or FIFO methodsof inventory
accounting.B4
Investint Tax Credit (k). Information onlegislated values of the
investment tax credit was taken from theWashington University Macro
Model.Information on the mixbetweenequipment and structures was
taken from aggregate data.
Cash flow (cr).Ourcash flow variable is taken from the Value Line
database.








Tax—Adjusted Q =(1-r 11c (.!j)+ — (1—k—rz)}
(Dividends Paid)